Inside the chapter: Foreign Currency Debt vs Local: Sovereign Borrowing Risks

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The idea in plain words

Foreign-currency debt is where emerging-market government crises most often break, because a government cannot print another country’s money. But borrowing in your own currency is not a guarantee of safety: Russia defaulted on its own-currency debt in 1998. And euro-area countries behave partly like borrowers in a foreign currency, because they cannot print euros themselves.

Key points

■Reinhart and Rogoff counted 68 overt domestic defaults since 1800; a Bank of Canada and Bank of England study found 32 local-currency defaulters in 1960 to 2019.

■Euro-area governments borrow in a currency they do not control; the ECB’s 2012 OMT backstop calmed that risk.

■Restructurings run through collective action clauses, the Paris Club, the G20 Common Framework and local-law exchanges.

■Face-value cuts understate losses: a 37% face cut can be a 53% present-value loss at a 9% exit yield.

A closer look

Volume I established, through Sri Lanka’s 2022 default, and Capital Markets Part 10 extended through the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, that foreign-currency debt is where emerging-market sovereign crises most often break. The mechanical reason belongs here: a government that borrows in its own currency can, in the most extreme circumstance, always technically create the money needed to service that debt (however inflationary a genuine last resort), while a government borrowing in a foreign currency has no such option — it must earn or acquire that specific foreign currency through exports, foreign investment, or foreign reserves, and simply cannot create more of another country’s money by decree. This is the single structural reason emerging market sovereign crises concentrate so heavily around foreign-currency-denominated debt specifically, rather than local-currency obligations.

A worked example

Worked Example — Four Restructurings Compared

Country Default What was restructured Outcome Greece 2012 exchange Private-sector bonds; collective action clauses written retroactively into €177.3 billion of Greek-law bonds by the Greek Bondholder Act €199.2 billion exchanged, 96.9% of eligible principal; face value cut about €107 billion (52%); present-value loss 59–65% Zambia November 2020, a missed $42.5 million bond payment $6.3 billion of official bilateral loans (agreed June 2023, nearly 40% present-value reduction) and $3 billion of Eurobonds (June 2024), under the Common Framework About 3.5 years from default to the bond deal Sri Lanka April 12, 2022, suspension of external debt service Domestic debt (2023, banks excluded); about $12.5 billion of international bonds, including macro-linked bonds whose payments are tied to economic performance Bond exchange with…

Under the hood

Under the Hood: How a Sovereign Restructuring Actually Works

There is no bankruptcy court for countries. A restructuring is a negotiation with each creditor group, and the machinery exists mainly to stop a minority from blocking the deal. Bondholders and collective action clauses (CACs). A CAC lets a qualified majority of bondholders change the payment terms for all holders of a bond. Older clauses voted bond by bond, so a fund could buy a blocking stake in one issue.

Decision rule

Classify every sovereign bond by who controls the currency it pays in, not by its label. If the issuer’s own central bank creates the currency, the main risks are inflation and depreciation; default is possible but rare, and most likely when the debt is very short or held by fragile domestic banks.

The costliest mistake

Treating a high-yield local-currency government bond as safe because “the government can always print.” For a dollar-based investor, printing is exactly the risk. A bond yielding 10% while the currency falls 30% returns 1.10 × 0.70 − 1 = −23% in dollars, with no default at all. Against a 4.5% dollar alternative, the break-even is a currency fall of only 1 − 1.045 ÷ 1.10 = 5.0% in a year.

Edge Cases: When the Standard Answer Changes

The rule “own-currency debt is safer” holds most of the time. These are the situations in which it bends. Situation What changes Why Euro-area member Euro debt behaves partly like foreign-currency debt The national government cannot direct the ECB to create euros; only a conditional backstop such as OMT closes the gap Very short local-currency debt A rollover crisis is possible even in the home currency Russia’s 1998 GKOs had to be refinanced constantly; when buyers vanished, the government chose…

Recap

Because a government cannot create another country’s money, emerging-market sovereign crises most often break on foreign-currency debt, but own-currency defaults such as Russia’s in 1998 do occur, and euro-area debt behaves partly like foreign-currency debt.

What the full article covers

The full article includes worked examples, a look under the hood at the mechanics, a clear decision rule, the one mistake that costs people the most, a recap, a reveal-on-click quiz and the official sources behind every figure.

Volume III: Finance Encyclopedia

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The complete article, Foreign Currency Debt vs Local: Sovereign Borrowing Risks, with every worked example, diagram, quiz and source, is free to read in Volume III, Finance Encyclopedia on finolib.com.

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